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I argue that semantics is the study of the proprietary database of a
centrally inaccessible and informationally encapsulated input–output
system. This system’s role is to encode and decode partial and defea-
sible evidence of what speakers are saying. Since information about
nonlinguistic context is therefore outside the purview of semantic pro-
cessing, a sentence’s semantic value is not its content but a partial
and defeasible constraint on what it can be used to say. I show how
to translate this thesis into a detailed compositional-semantic theory
based on the influential framework of Heim and Kratzer. This ap-
proach situates semantics within an independently motivated account
of human cognitive architecture and reveals the semantics–pragmatics
interface to be grounded in the underlying interface between modular
and central systems.
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My aim is to answer two questions about compositional semantics and to
explore the relationship between them. First, a methodological question:
What kinds of semantic values should a semantic theory assign to expres-
sions? Second, a foundational question: What is the subject matter of
compositional semantics? My answer to the first question is that the se-
mantic value of an expression is a constraint on what speakers can say with
the expression, and not the content of what they say. My answer to the
second question is that semantics is the study of a modular component of
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the mind. I will defend each of these claims, in part by defending the latter
view and showing that it entails the former (Section 2), and then by showing
how to modify a standard compositional-semantic framework to make it fit
with both ideas (Section 3).
1 TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SEMANTIC VAL-
UES
My first order of business is to distinguish between two theories of the na-
ture of semantic values, which I will call content semantics and constraint
semantics.
1.1 Semantic values as contents
Content semantics is the view that an expression’s semantic value is its con-
tent and that this content may vary in a way that depends on extralinguistic
context. This idea is implemented in different ways by different theoretical
frameworks, in part because of disagreement about what contents are. The
most influential framework identifies the semantic value of an expression φ,
indexed to a world w, assignment g, and context c, with an extension JφKw,g,c
(or, by λ-abstracting over the world parameter, with an intension JφKg,c).1
Idealizing away from tense, aspect, clause-type, and some other complica-
tions, the semantic value of “Ann smokes” can be specified in either of the
following ways, for example:
(1) JAnn smokesKw,g,c = 1 iff Ann smokes at w
(2) JAnn smokesKg,c = λw . Ann smokes at w
The sentence’s semantic content—the proposition that is true at all and only
worlds where Ann smokes—is given by (2). Sentential semantic values like
these can be derived by positing contents for lexical items—for example, a
referent for “Ann” as in (3) and the property of being a smoker to “smokes”
as in (4)—and formulating principles of content composition, such as (5).
(3) JAnnKw,g,c = Ann
1I will treat the framework of Heim and Kratzer (1998) and von Fintel and Heim (2011)
as my foil, refer to it as “the standard framework”, and use its claims and notation as a
starting point. There are interesting questions about how the morals of this essay apply
to various alternative frameworks, but I lack space to pursue them here.
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(4) JsmokesKw,g,c = λxe . x smokes at w
(5) functional application
If α is a branching node and tβ, γu the set of its daughters, then, for
any assignment g, α is in the domain of J¨Kw,g,c if both β and γ are,
and JβKw,g,c is a function whose domain contains JγKw,g,c. In this case,JαKw,g,c = JβKw,g,c(JγKw,g,c).
The overarching idea of clauses like (1)–(5) is that the semantic value of
a declarative sentence is a propositional content that can be computed by
positing contents for subsentential expressions and principles of content com-
position.
The assignment parameter g and context parameter c come into play
because many natural-language expressions are semantically underspecified.
Each of the following sentences cannot have any single proposition as its
semantic value, for example, because it expresses (or is used to express)
different propositions on different occasions.
(6) I smoke.
(7) The man smokes.
(8) He smokes.
The standard solution is to assume that the assignment and context param-
eters do some of the work in determining these sentences’ contents. For any
context c, there will be a speakerc who is the semantic value of “I” relative
to c, for example (Kaplan, 1989b). This yields the following value for (6).
(9) JI smokeKg,c = λw . speakerc smokes at w
This strategy has been extended in various ways to handle other expressions.
It is common to posit a hidden, context-sensitive domain restrictor in the LF
of every DP, so that (7) is understood to have an LF of the following form,
for example (Stanley, 2000; Stanley & Szabo´, 2000; Westerst˚ahl, 1984).
(10) [DP The man dom] smokes.
On this simplified version of the proposal, dom functions as an unpronounced
restrictive relative clause that somehow gets its value from context. Just how
contexts supply semantic values is usually left unclear, though it is widely
agreed that most context-dependent expressions depend in some way on
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facts about the mental states of whoever is involved in the conversation.
One popular view is that context-sensitive expressions’ semantic values are
fixed by speakers’ intentions.2
Finally, deictic pronouns, such as the occurrence of “he” in (8), are stan-
dardly taken to be sensitive to the assignment parameter. It is assumed that
each pronoun is subscripted with a numerical index, and that assignments
are mappings from indices to semantic values. The semantic value of a pro-
noun xi, relative to an assignment g, is gpiq, subject to presuppositional con-
straints imposed by x’s φ-features. This gives rise to assignment-dependent
sentential semantic values, such as (12).
(11) JHe1 smokesKg,c = λw . gp1q smokes at w if gp1q is male; else
undefined
The assignment relative to which an expression’s content is fixed is itself,
according to the standard framework, given by context. So although context
and assignment are often treated as distinct parameters, we can follow Heim
and Kratzer in assuming that each context, c, determines an assignment, gc,
thereby collapsing the two parameters:
(12) JHe1 smokesKc = λw . gcp1q smokes at w if gcp1q is male; else
undefined.
What about a context fixes the operative assignment? Heim and Kratzer
(1998) say only that “the physical and psychological circumstances that
prevail when an LF is processed will (if the utterance is felicitous) determine
an assignment to all the free variables occurring in this LF” (p. 243). Most
attempts to be more specific point either to the speaker’s intentions (Heim,
2008; King, 2013) or to facts about the shared propositional attitudes of the
conversation’s participants (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Heim, 1982; Roberts,
2005; Stalnaker, 1978).
Why divide off a category of expressions that are indirectly sensitive to
context by being sensitive to assignments? The reason is that pronouns can
also have bound occurrences. For example, (8) can occur embedded in (13).
(13) [Every doctor]1 denies that he1 smokes.
2For example, Heim (2008); Kaplan (1989a); King (2013). This view should be distin-
guished from the view that although the semantic value of a semantically underspecified
expression φ is not itself a content, the content of what speakers say by uttering φ is a
matter of their intentions. The latter view, which is compatible with the nonexistence of
semantic content, and which I think is roughly correct, has been defended by Bach (1987,
1992); Neale (2004, 2016); Schiffer (2003).
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In the standard framework, binding is understood in terms of compositional
operations that abstract over the assignment-sensitive components of an ex-
pression, turning them into argument places in a complex predicate that
can compose with the binding expression. As Heim and Kratzer (1998) put
it, “roughly, what is meant by ‘variable binding’ is any semantic operation
which removes (or reduces) assignment dependency” (p. 116). A treatment
on which pronouns depend on contexts by depending on assignments is thus
necessary for a unified treatment of their bound and deictic (i.e., free) oc-
currences. Assignment-dependent expressions are therefore variables, unlike
directly context-dependent expressions. Just where to draw the line be-
tween variables and directly context-dependent expressions is not always
clear, though one crucial issue is whether they can be bound (Stanley &
Szabo´, 2000). I stress this distinction because it will become important
again later: One quirk of the semantic framework I will build in Section 3 is
that it classifies more expressions as variables than is sometimes assumed.
1.2 Semantic values as constraints
Constraint semantics, as I understand it, is the view that an expression’s
semantic value is not its context-relative content but something context-
neutral and therefore less informative. Roughly, the semantic value of an
expression φ is just what a competent speaker can know about what someone
would be saying in uttering φ, assuming they were speaking literally, but
without any knowledge about the context or the speaker’s intentions. For
an expression to be semantically underspecified is for there to be slack in
the constraint that its semantic value places on what it can be used to say.
For example, the semantic value of “he” tells a hearer that the speaker is
referring to a male (if they are speaking literally), but not which male. If a
view like this is correct, there may be no need for compositional semantics
to traffic in a theoretical notion of context at all.3
I am not the first to advocate constraint semantics. Sperber and Wilson
(1995) say that a sentence’s “semantic representation is a schema, which
must be completed and integrated into an assumption about the speaker’s
informative intention” (p.175; see also Carston 2006, p. 633). According to
Pietroski (2006), the meanings of declarative sentences “constrain without
determining truth/reference/satisfaction conditions” (p. 34). Bach (1987)
argues that “the semantics of an expression gives the information that a com-
petent speaker can glean from it independently of any context of utterance”
3Note that constraint semantics, as I conceive it, does not give up the idea that propo-
sitions are the things we assert, say, or mean.
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(p. 5), and sometimes refers to sentential semantic values as “propositional
radicals” (Bach, 2006, p. 437). Neale (2005) argues that a sentence’s seman-
tic value should be thought of as “a blueprint for (a template, a schematic
or skeletal representation of) what someone will be taken to be saying when
using [the sentence] to say something” (p. 189). Schiffer (2003, p.112) ar-
gues that the semantic value of a sentence partially specifies the force and
content of the illocutionary act that the sentence can be used to literally
perform (cf., Garc´ıa-Carpintero, 2006).4
Many of the proposals I have just mentioned have been motivated roughly
as follows. There is a deep distinction between the kinds of psychological
capacities studied by semantics and pragmatics. Pragmatics studies an ap-
plication of our capacity for mindreading: To communicate is to have one’s
communicative intention recognized by the intended addressee. Semantics,
by contrast, is the study of a psychological mechanism that encodes and
decodes partial and defeasible evidence of speakers’ communicative inten-
tions. Since identifying what a speaker says with a semantically underspec-
ified expression typically involves mindreading—and therefore pragmatic
reasoning—semantics can be in the business of specifying only constraints,
rather than contents. My aim in Section 2 will be to argue that this line of
thought identifies a real joint in nature that is robust enough to ground the
semantics–pragmatics distinction.
A significant weakness of nearly all prior defenses of constraint semantics
is that their foundational claims have not been accompanied by compositional-
semantic implementation details. Nearly all of the authors mentioned above
have eschewed the task of constructing a detailed compositional-semantic
theory that outputs constraints rather than context-relativized contents.5 I
will therefore demonstrate one way of tackling this problem in Section 3.
4Some have argued that semantics should pair expressions with both contents and
context-neutral semantic values, referring to the latter, respectively, as “characters” (Ka-
plan, 1989b, p. 507), “reflexive contents” (Perry, 2001), or “propositional concepts” (Stal-
naker, 1978). In Section 2, I will argue that semantics should deal only in context-neutral
semantic values.
5An important exception is Pietroski (2018), who has fleshed out the formal-semantic
details of his foundational vision, but who departs much further from the semantic ortho-
doxy than I will here.
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2 SEMANTICS AND COGNITIVE ARCHITEC-
TURE
2.1 The modularity of semantics
One could take the content–constraint issue to be an idle one. This is
the position of Lewis (1980), who shows how to distinguish context-neutral
meanings from the usual context-dependent intensions but argues that both
“equally well deserve the name of semantic values because they equally well
do the jobs of semantic values” (p.92) Lewis assumes that the job of seman-
tic values is to be whatever it is that a good grammar assigns to expressions,
and that “a good grammar is one suited to play a certain role in a systematic
restatement of our common knowledge about language” (p.81).
My aim in this section is to argue that we have good reason to prefer con-
straint semantics over content semantics. My argument rests on the claim
that whereas pragmatics is (or at least includes) the study of how language
use depends on central-cognitive inferential capacities, including mindread-
ing, semantics is by contrast the study of a modular input–output system in
Fodor’s (1983) sense.6 Although this system outputs representations to cen-
tral cognition in language perception and takes inputs from central cognition
in language production, it draws only on a proprietary database of informa-
tion in carrying out its computations. I will refer to the system in question
as the “semantic module”, to the task it performs in speech perception—
computing sentential semantic values from LFs—as “semantic composition”,
and to its proprietary database as “semantic competence”. On my view, the
aim of compositional semantics is to reverse-engineer language users’ seman-
tic competence, in part by isolating it from the information available to their
central-cognitive system(s), such as their beliefs.
This picture gives us reason to reject Lewis’s view that semantics aims to
model speakers’ “common knowledge about language”, since this assump-
tion wrongly lumps together at least two functionally distinct bodies of in-
formation that play different roles in language use. On one hand, semantic
competence informs the operations of the semantic module. On the other
hand, our beliefs and other intentional mental states are drawn upon by
pragmatic reasoning but are off limits to the semantic module. An empiri-
cally adequate account of the psychological states underlying language use
6I will not take a stand on whether what Fodor labels “central cognition” is itself
divided into domain-specific subsystems with distinct evolutionary origins (Carruthers,
2006; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Sperber & Wilson, 2002).
7
must not conflate these two bodies of information.7,8
If contemporary semantic theories are on the right track, then semantic
composition draws on at least two kinds of information—lexical semantic val-
ues and composition principles—in order to perform this task. Why should
we think that semantic composition is a modular process whose proprietary
database includes information of these kinds?9
First, note that semantic composition has many of the stereotypical
features of processes carried out by Fodorian modules. It is fast. It is
mandatory, in that we cannot voluntarily choose not to perceive linguistic
utterances as meaningful. Although semantic composition is not driven by
the outputs of a proprietary sensory transducer, it is domain-specific in the
sense that it can act only on a specific kind of inputs (LFs). As semanticists
have shown us, semantic composition resembles typical modular processes
in that its proprietary database is amenable to computational modeling.
Unlike many central-cognitive processes, semantic composition is not folk-
psychologically scrutable.
Most importantly, semantic composition is performed by a system that
is, in large part, informationally isolated from central cognition. The se-
mantic module sends outputs to central cognition as one step in language
comprehension, and takes instructions from central cognition as one step in
language production, but there are good reasons to think that it otherwise
lacks access to the inner workings and informational resources of central
cognition, and vice versa.
One half of this informational isolation is that the operations and database
of the semantic module are centrally inaccessible. Language users are not
aware of the intermediate steps of semantic composition or of the contents
of the database on which it draws. Theorists have at various times dis-
agreed about nearly all of the principles underlying semantic composition,
7Lewis (1980) anticipated that “a grammar that assigns one sort of semantic value
could fit better into future psycholinguistics than one that assigns another sort” (p. 83),
but claimed that it would be speculative to draw any such conclusion at the time. I reply
that this is not a speculative project at present, and that we now have good reasons to
prefer constraints over contents.
8Some have denied that semantics is the study of any aspect of human psychology—for
example, Devitt (2006); Katz (1981); Soames (1985). I will bracket these views for lack of
space and assume that semantics is the study of a body of information that plays a causal
role in language perception and production.
9For previous defenses of modularity about semantics, see Borg (2004, Chapter 3) and
Sperber and Wilson (1995, Chapter 4). I discuss Borg’s view in Section 2.2. I agree, in
essence, with Sperber and Wilson, but my arguments differ from theirs in appealing to
contemporary semantic theory.
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and none of these debates has been resolved by direct cognitive access to
the semantic module. Instead, the inner workings and informational re-
sources of the semantic module must be painstakingly reverse engineered.
These points are particularly clear if we focus on the aspects of semantic
theories on which research in semantics is focused. For example: Are the
semantic-type mismatches created by object-position DPs resolved through
quantifier raising (May, 1985), in-situ type-shifting (Szabolcsi, 1987), or by
some other mechanism? Are proper names devices of direct reference (Ka-
plan, 1989b), variables (Cumming, 2008; Schoubye, 2016), predicates (Fara,
2015), quantifiers (Montague, 1973), or type-flexible (Partee, 1986)? Ques-
tions like these are the bread and butter of contemporary semantics, and
yet we utterly lack the ability to answer them by introspecting or otherwise
cognitively accessing the semantic principles or processes that allow us to
use the expressions concerned.
Indeed, most language users lack the conceptual resources to even con-
sider questions like these. If contemporary semanticists are on the right
track, then we routinely represent linguistic inputs in terms of concepts
that are sequestered from central cognition—concepts such as semantic
type and numerical index. I will call these “centrally inaccessible con-
cepts”. Although different semantic frameworks posit semantic represen-
tations involving different centrally inaccessible concepts, every framework
posits some such concepts. For example, variable-free semantics eschews
numerical indices but posits copious type-shifting operations that are sen-
sitive to semantic values’ semantic types (Jacobson, 2014). But it is deeply
implausible that ordinary language-users have the capacity to have beliefs,
intentions, or other central-cognitive representations about things like nu-
merical indices or semantic types—at least not without training in semantics.
The second half of the language module’s isolation is its informational
encapsulation. Semantic composition is insensitive to language-users’ beliefs,
intentions, and other central-cognitive states or information. The main rea-
son for thinking so is that hearers sometimes have beliefs and other states
that would be relevant to semantic processing but that have no effect on it.
Pettit (2002, 2005) has illustrated this point with respect to hearers’ be-
liefs about word meanings. In the case he imagines, devious neuroscientists
have convinced a subject to falsely believe that his “brain has been altered
so as to produce an aphasia the effect of which is that all of the mass nouns
in [his] vocabulary will seem to [him] to mean something they do not in fact
mean” (Pettit, 2002, p. 544). The subject is then presented with example
sentences such as (14).
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(14) Let’s have mud for lunch.
The subject has false beliefs about the meaning of “mud”, both before and
after encountering this sentence. But Pettit argues that these beliefs do not
interfere with the subject’s ability to understand utterances of sentences
like (14). An utterance of (14) will still seem to the subject to have the
correct meaning, even if the subject treats this impression as unreliable
evidence about what the speaker is saying with it on this occasion. This
case is analogous to illusions that have driven some of the most influential
arguments for the modularity of visual perception. What makes the Mu¨ller-
Lyer illusion such a striking illustration of informational encapsulation, for
example, is that its two central lines continue to seem to have different
lengths, no matter how strongly one believes that they are the same length
(Fodor, 1983, p. 66).10
Here is a potential objection to the foregoing argument. If I tell you
that I will use “dog” to mean what people normally mean by “cat” for the
rest of the present conversation, you will be able to understand me on these
terms. Does this not show that your beliefs about the meaning of “dog”
can play a role in how you will understand utterances of that word? The
problem with this objection is that it equivocates two senses in which one
can “understand” an utterance. The kind of understanding that is relevant
to my argument is successful semantic composition. This is distinct from
understanding a speaker, which entails forming a veridical representation
(perhaps a true belief) about what they said or meant by their utterance.
On my view, what a speaker says or means is never identical to the semantic
value of the sentence they utter, and so central-cognitive work is needed to
bridge the gap between these two forms of understanding. A sentence’s
semantic value gives a hearer only partial evidence of what the speaker
means. I also maintain that the output of semantic composition gives a
hearer only defeasible evidence of what a speaker says or means. Imagine a
hearer who understands a speaker in spite of the fact that the speaker has
uttered a malapropism. Hearing Yogi Berra utter the sentence, “Texas has
a lot of electrical votes”, a hearer may come to recognize that Berra meant
that Texas has a lot of electoral votes. On my view, this process will go
roughly as follows: The hearer’s semantic module outputs a representation
10For a recent defense of the modularity of visual perception that emphasizes similar
evidence for informational encapsulation, see Firestone and Scholl (2016). Although Pettit
(2002) does not present his case as evidence for modularity, he briefly makes that impli-
cation explicit and mentions the analogy to visual illusions in a follow-up article (Pettit,
2005, p. 74).
10
that gives the hearer evidence that Berra said, of something called “Texas”,
that it has a lot of electrical votes. Bringing to bear the resources of central
cognition—perhaps unconsciously—the hearer infers that this evidence must
not be accurate and, noting the similarity of “electrical” and “electoral”,
concludes that Berra meant (and perhaps said)11 that Texas has a lot of
electoral votes. Similarly, in my “dog”/“cat” scenario, the prediction of my
view is that when I utter “dog” it will initially seem to my hearer that I
am saying something about dogs, since this is what their semantic module
indicates, but they may correct for this misleading evidence with a little
extra cognitive work. We might expect this extra work to manifest itself
as extra time or cognitive load spent on understanding utterances in which
words are being used with known but nonstandard meanings.
My Pettit-inspired argument focuses on the impenetrability of semantic
composition by our beliefs about the most intuitive semantic properties of
open-class vocabulary, such as the belief that the word “mud” refers to mud.
These are semantic features that are rough and obvious enough to be tracked
by ordinary speakers’ folk theories. Matters are much more cut and dried
when it comes to the semantic properties of expressions that determine how
they compose—that is, the properties about which theorists tend to debate.
Suppose, for example, that two semanticists—call them “Robert” and
“Pauline”—are having a conversation. Robert obstinately believes that
object-position DPs are raised at LF and interpreted via a predicate-abstraction
principle. Pauline vehemently denies the existence of raising and believes
that object-position DPs are interpreted in situ with the help of type-shifting
operations. At least one of our two semanticists must be wrong, which is to
say that their belief is inconsistent with the actual compositional principles
and processes that allow them to use language. If semantic composition
were not an informationally encapsulated process—if it were sensitive to
agents’ beliefs—then we should expect strongly avowed false beliefs about
semantic matters to have a deleterious effect on an agent’s ability to create
and understand meaningful utterances. But there is no evidence for top-
down effects of this kind. Indeed, it would be truly shocking if we were
to find evidence that believing certain semantic theories either enhanced or
detracted from one’s linguistic capacities, even a little bit. The explanation
for this fact is that our beliefs and other central-cognitive representations
about compositional-semantic matters have no impact on the activities of
11See Unnsteinsson (2017) for a defense of the claim that what a speaker says with
a malapropism may be their intended meaning, and need not match the word’s literal
meaning.
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the semantic module. This is a powerful reason to think that the gram-
matical principles that guide semantic composition inhabit the proprietary
database of a cognitively impenetrable system.
One complication for the idea that semantics is the study of a modular
system arises from the fact that this system presumably plays a role in
language production as well as comprehension. This means that the system
must be capable of taking input from central cognition in the course of
speech production. I see no reason to think that this fact undermines the
informational encapsulation of the language module in its role as an input
system. There is also a clear sense in which the semantic module qua output
system is informationally encapsulated. The representations at intermediate
stages of semantic processing and many of the concepts in terms of which
these representations are framed are just as centrally inaccessible on the
way out as they are on the way in. Speakers do not recognize themselves
as designing particular semantic representations in the course of producing
an utterance, and they cannot, in part because some of the concepts that
would be needed in order to do so are centrally inaccessible. Speakers thus
are not in a position to interfere with semantic processing at these stages,
or to otherwise integrate central information with intermediate semantic
representations in language production. A speaker cannot choose whether to
represent proper names as type-e terms or as type-et predicates, for example.
Likewise, our disagreeing semanticists, Robert and Pauline, cannot bring
their theoretical beliefs to bear on whether to represent the meanings of
object-position DPs by means of quantifier raising or type shifting. And so
although my focus here is on language perception, in part because it is less
clear how the cognition–semantics interface might work in production, there
are some preliminary reasons to adopt a modular account of production as
well.
A second complication arises from the fact that the semantic module
needs to acquire, maintain, and update some of the information in its pro-
prietary database. We are not born representing the semantic value of “dog”.
How do we get it? I will not pretend to have an answer to this question;
the study of semantic acquisition is nascent compared to the study of, for
example, syntactic acquisition. However, we have reason to expect that a
good answer will take the form of a computational theory of the kind offered
by psycholinguists working within the framework of generative grammar.12
Theories in this tradition typically posit domain-specific learning mecha-
nisms that are, to a significant extent, dissociated from the operations of
12For a recent survey of the kind of work I have in mind, see Guasti (2017).
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central cognition (Newport, 1990). One reason to anticipate that such an
explanation will be required is that acquiring semantic competence with any
vocabulary item requires coming to represent it in terms of centrally inac-
cessible concepts. In order to acquire the verb “to run”, one must discern
not only that it is used to talk about running; one must also represent its
argument structure, its semantic type, and so forth (Pinker & Jackendoff,
2005, pp. 205–206). Since these are centrally inaccessible concepts, semantic
acquisition cannot be a simple transfer of information from central cogni-
tion to the semantic module’s database. Still, it seems likely that there
is some such transfer during acquisition.13 However, from the fact that
information flows from central cognition into the semantic module via an
acquisition mechanism, it does not follow that this information can affect
online processing by the semantic module in its role as an input system, and
my arguments in this section suggest that it does not.
2.2 Modularity and constraint semantics
What does the modularity of semantics have to do with the content–constraint
debate that I outlined in Section 1? My argument, in brief, goes as follows.
Content semantics presupposes that all of the information needed to identify
the content of a sentence in a context of utterance is available to semantic
composition. However, if semantic composition is an informationally en-
capsulated process, then it does not have access to all of the information
that it would need in order to identify lexical expressions’ contents. Identi-
fying the contents of semantically underspecified expressions—is a process
that draws on all manner of central-cognitive information. If I am right
that semantic composition is a modular process and content resolution is a
central-cognitive process, then semantics can deliver only constraints, not
contents.
My reason for thinking that content resolution is a central-cognitive pro-
cess is that understanding what someone has said with a semantically un-
derspecified expression—what they have referred to with a deictic use of a
pronoun, or whether they are using “may” in a deontic or epistemic sense, for
example—is a process that requires information about extralinguistic con-
text, including information about other agents’ mental states. This point
is well rehearsed in the literature, and so I will not belabor it here.14 But
13Bloom (2000, Chapter 3) and Hacquard and Lidz (2018) both present evidence that
semantic acquisition recruits mindreading, for example.
14See, for example, Bach (1987); Borg (2004, 2012); Carston (2002); Fodor (2002); Neale
(2004, 2007); Recanati (2004); and Sperber & Wilson (1995).
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several points bear emphasis. First, notice that the claim applies even to the
most straightforward indexical expressions, such as “I” and “today”. In or-
der to identify the content conveyed by an anonymous letter that reads, “to-
day, I love you”, I would need to somehow infer the identity of the sender and
the day on which it was sent, for example. Second, the claim that content
resolution is a central-cognitive process does not depend on any particular
view of what fixes the contents of semantically underspecified expressions.
Some have argued that recognizing what a speaker says with semantically
underspecified expressions is a matter of inferring the speaker’s communica-
tive or referential intentions.15 Others have emphasized the importance of
integrating grammatical information with the information that is commonly
known or accepted, or otherwise shared by the interlocutors.16 Either way,
content resolution is a process that relies heavily on mindreading, which is
a paradigmatic central-cognitive task.17
I am not the first to defend a revisionary claim about the nature of
semantic values with an argument from the modularity of semantics. One
previous attempt at this line of thought is due to Emma Borg (2004, 2012),
who uses it to defend her version of semantic minimalism. Borg characterizes
minimalism as the view that the semantic value of a sentence is a minimal
proposition—a proposition derived with input from context only when that
input is required by syntactically overt, context-sensitive elements. On her
view, then, the semantic module is subject to roughly the same constraints
that I have outlined here, and yet it invariably outputs a proposition when
given the LF of a declarative sentence as an input.
The challenge for a view like Borg’s is to explain how the semantic
module can identify the contents of semantically underspecified expressions.
Borg has defended a controversial answer to this challenge. As a case study,
15Bach (1992); Heim (2008); Kaplan (1989a); King (2013); and Neale (2004, 2007).
16Clark & Marshall (1981); Heim (1982); King (2013); Lewis (1979); Roberts (2002);
and Stalnaker (1978).
17The alternative is to think that content resolution relies on information from a dis-
course context that is fully under grammatical control (Lepore & Stone, 2015; Stojnic´
et al., 2017). This opens up the possibility that content resolution relies only on in-
formation available to a semantic module. But the cost of this grammaticalization is
the proliferation of ambiguities whenever the prior discourse does not fully determine a
discourse context that in turn determines a unique content for each semantically under-
specified expression. In effect, advocates of this view treat semantic underspecification as
ambiguity at the discourse level (thus proliferating ambiguities). Disambiguation is itself
a central-cognitive task that typically involves mindreading—a point that these authors
grant (Lepore & Stone, 2015, Chapter 13). Drawing out the lessons for these views of
my arguments in this paper would take considerable space, and so I will bracket further
discussion for now.
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she considers a situation in which a speaker utters (15), thereby saying that
A is red.
(15) That is red.
According to Borg, demonstratives are directly referential singular terms
whose referents are determined by speakers’ intentions. A hearer’s semantic
module therefore lacks the resources to identify A as the referent of “that”
in a “substantive, nonlinguistic sense” (Borg, 2012, xviii). Still, Borg thinks
that the semantic module has a metalinguistically mediated way of identi-
fying the propositional content of (15).
I claim that the semantic content a hearer is required to en-
tertain when faced with an utterance of a sentence like That
is red in a given context c, will contain a singular concept in
subject-position, the content of which is exhausted by the ob-
ject to which the speaker refers. However I also allow that all
that is required, from the perspective of linguistic understand-
ing, is that the hearer be able to think about that object under
the token-reflexive description (which gives the character of the
concept) ‘the actual object referred to by the speaker with this
token of “that”’. (Borg, 2012, p. xviii)
So the semantic module identifies the content of “that” by grasping a singu-
lar concept C, and they grasp C by formulating a metalinguistic description
of C’s referent. Since this description will be the same for every occurrence
of “that”, Borg thinks of it as the character of C—a piece of information
that can be combined with information about extralinguistic context to de-
termine C’s referent.
Here is a response to this view that I find tempting. Despite Borg’s
insistence that sentential semantic values are propositions, the theory she
actually articulates sounds much more like constraint semantics than content
semantics. On her view, what the semantic module delivers when given
(15) as an input is a piece of context-neutral information about what the
speaker has said rather than the context-specific content of what they said.
Indeed, on Borg’s view, the information delivered by a hearer’s semantic
module when given (15) as input will be the same on every occasion, and
will be the same whether the hearer is the well-informed addressee or an
eavesdropper who is completely uninformed about the speaker’s intentions
and the extralinguistic context. A hearer who has this information still
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needs to integrate it with information from the context in order to identify
(15)’s content “in a substantive sense”. As Borg (2012) puts it,
[T]hat A is the referent of this utterance is settled by features be-
yond the reach of semantics and, furthermore, to put this seman-
tic content to use (i.e. to use it to inform ones dealings with the
world) the hearer normally needs to go on to non-linguistically
identify A. (p. 135)
Still, she maintains that “as far as linguistic meaning or semantic content is
concerned such issues of substantive object-identification are irrelevant”.18
I suspect that Borg would reject this interpretation of her view. In ex-
plaining minimal semantics, she repeatedly stresses that the semantic value
of a sentence is its propositional content, and not merely a partial charac-
terization of that content (Borg 2012, pp. 4–5). It is difficult to decide this
issue concretely, since Borg does not tell us how to implement her view in
a compositional-semantic framework of the kind I introduced in Section 1.
The only implementation suggestion that she does tentatively endorse is that
a semantic theory should pair sentences with conditional truth conditions,
such as the following:19
(16) If the speaker of “this is red” refers with the utterance of “this” therein
to x and to nothing else, then this sentence, as uttered in this context,
is true if and only if x is red.
But again, it seems to me that a theory that pairs sentences with outputs
like (16) would be better described as a constraint semantics than a content
semantics. After all, (16) is something that I currently know about every
utterance of “this is red” that has ever been produced, without knowing
anything about those utterances’ extralinguistic contexts, and (16) certainly
does not itself determine a content for any particular utterance of “this is
red”.
As I see it, Borg would be better off without her assumption that “ev-
ery well-formed sentence, perhaps relativized to a context of utterance, is
capable of expressing a proposition” (Borg, 2012, p. xiv). Although Borg
18Gar´ıa-Carpintero (2013) likewise argues that Borg’s claim that sentential semantic
values are propositions is not obviously consistent with the rest of her view.
19Borg (2012, p. 135) takes (16) from Higginbotham (1994, pp. 92–3). Conditional
truth-condition views have also been endorsed by Burge (1974); Gross (2005); Heck (2014);
Higginbotham (1988); and Larson and Segal (1995).
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defends propositionalism against various attacks (none of which I have dis-
cussed here), she offers few positive motivations for the view. One is that
propositionalism has been presupposed by traditional work in formal se-
mantics (Borg, 2012, pp. 6–7).20 My response to this argument will come
in Section 3, where I show that it is relatively simple to modify the stan-
dard framework to output constraints rather than contents. Borg’s second
motivation for propositionalism is that “it is natural” to think of sentences
as conveying information, referring to contents when embedded in attitude
constructions, standing in logical relations, and conveying reasons for belief
(Borg, 2012, pp. 7–8). But of course, it is equally natural to say that speakers
use sentences to convey information, to refer to propositions when uttered
in embedded contexts, to express contents that stand in logical relations,
and to convey reasons for belief, and the latter description is compatible
with my view here.
The failure to question content semantics has led others who are sensitive
to considerations about mental architecture either to conclude that compo-
sitional semantics, as usually conceived, is impossible (Fodor, 2002)), or to
give up on the modularity of semantics and conclude that the composition
of expressions’ contents is a messy, pragmatic process that is performed by
central cognition (Recanati, 2010). But again, each of these views is rooted
in the erroneous assumption that semantics must deal in contents.
I wish to conclude, instead, that semantics should deliver constraints.
One advantage of this view is that, unlike its competitors, it allows for a
precise semantics–pragmatics interface that is grounded in underlying facts
about human cognitive architecture. The semantics–pragmatics interface
turns out to be an instance of the interface between central cognition and
its peripheral input–output systems. If this is also where we locate the
perception–cognition interface—an admittedly controversial view21—then
the semantics–pragmatics interface also turns out to coincide with the in-
terface between language perception and general-purpose cognition.
20Borg does not discuss the well-established traditions in formal semantics, such as dy-
namic semantics, discourse representation theory, and variable-free semantics, that reject
propositionalism for reasons unrelated to my arguments or position here.
21For defenses of the encapsulation of visual perception (and perhaps perception more
broadly), see Firestone & Scholl (2016); Fodor (1983); Pylyshyn (1999). For the opposing
view, see Churchland (1988); Prinz (2006); and Vetter and Newman (2014).
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3 CONSTRAINT SEMANTICS
My goal in this remaining section is to develop a constraint semantics by
minimally adjusting the standard framework.22 I will proceed in stages,
first showing how to give a compositional semantics of the overall kind I
am after, then showing how to refine this theory to handle a wide range of
semantically underspecified expressions.
I begin with a pair of methodological points.
First, my strategy is to show how to arrive at a constraint semantics by
conservatively modifying the most well-known semantic framework available.
This is almost certainly not the best way to develop an elegant compositional
theory of constraints. It seems quite likely that heterodox frameworks could
be made to deliver the semantic values I seek in more principled and less
roundabout ways.23 However, the point of my approach is to demonstrate
that radical departures from semantic orthodoxy are not necessary in order
to achieve a result that is consistent with the foundational lessons I have
drawn.
Second, the standard way of defending claims about the semantic values
of a given kind of expression is to show that this would best explain our truth-
value judgments about sentences that embed expressions of this kind. I will
be arguing that the semantic values of declarative sentences are type-xst, ty
properties of propositions rather than the standard type-st propositions.
The usual strategy would be to show that this view is needed to make
sense of sentences containing embedded declaratives. This will not be my
strategy here, although I agree that it is worth considering. Some readers
might therefore be tempted to complain that I have not provided adequate
evidence for my position. To these readers I reply that they are missing
the overarching point of this essay, which is that integrating semantics into
broader cognitive science means finding new sources of evidence to constrain
22The theory presented here also inherits some limitations in its explanatory scope from
the standard framework as regards, for example, presupposition projection and discourse
anaphora. There is no space for adequate engagement with these phenomena here. I hope
to address them in future work.
23For example, alternative semantics provides us with tools that could be used to di-
rectly compose underspecified subsentential semantic values (Alonso-Ovalle, 2006; Cia-
rdelli et al., 2017; Kratzer & Shimoyama, 2002); variable-free semantics provides us with
methods of delivering underspecified sentential semantic values without proliferating vari-
ables (Jacobson, 2014); and Pietroski (2018) has developed a compositional-semantic
framework that eschews contents (along with other orthodoxies) for reasons that com-
plement those I have presented here. In future work I hope to explore how tools from
these alternative approaches may better realize my foundational vision.
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semantic theorizing. It should not be surprising if the result falls outside
semanticists’ usual methodology.
3.1 Semantic values as characters?
I have been arguing that the semantic value of a sentence is not its context-
relativized content but something context-neutral that specifies the range
of contents that can be said by using the sentence literally. How should a
semantic value of this kind be represented?
One possible answer is that semantic values are characters—functions
from contexts to contents. Instead of the usual context-parameterized con-
tent, (17), for example, the semantic value of “it stinks” could be given as
(18).
(17) Jit1 stinksKc = λw . gcp1q stinks at w
(18) Jit1 stinksK = λc . λw . gcp1q stinks at w
Here is a simple way of achieving this result. We leave the compositional
machinery of content semantics in place, but posit a single extra step at the
end of every compositional derivation. This extra step would be an operation
that simply abstracts over the context parameter, thus transforming (17)
into (18), for example.
On this view, the semantic module’s output, given a sentence’s LF as
input, is the sentence’s character. Having received a sentence’s character
from the semantic module, central cognition must identify the context in
which it was uttered and apply the character to it in order to identify the
utterance content. Content resolution is just the process of identifying the
right context and plugging it into a sentence’s character in this way—a
central-cognitive task that happens after the semantic module has done its
work. The semantic module still has to work with representations of contexts
at intermediate stages of its derivation, up until the point at which they are
abstracted away. But these can be mere placeholders with dummy values
and so need not incorporate any information to which the module lacks
access.
This is a simple and attractive picture, and my positive proposal will
resemble it in some ways. However, I do not think that it can be correct.
My reason is that this proposal requires language users’ central-cognitive
system(s) to be capable of working with representations that are framed in
terms of centrally inaccessible concepts, such as those of assignment func-
tions and numerical indices. For example, if my central system is given (18),
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and if contexts of utterance are the sorts of things that can be mapped to
propositions by (18), then identifying a context of utterance for “it stinks”
and deriving a proposition from it will require me to have beliefs (or other
propositional attitudes) about the assignment function g that is determined
by that context and to work out what g assigns to the numerical index 1.
But this is a bad consequence for two reasons. First, it is implausible on its
face that being a competent language user requires having beliefs or other
attitudes about assignment functions and the indices in their domain. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the idea that human language processing traffics
in assignments is at best a working hypothesis of contemporary linguistics—
one that resulted from the sort of reverse engineering that is characteristic
of black-box investigations, and one that is denied by proponents of compet-
ing views (e.g., Jacobson, 2014). Assuming that representations of variable
assignments play a role in semantic processing, then, we should conclude
that they feature only in centrally inaccessible intermediate stages of repre-
sentation within the language module.
It might be protested at this point that I am taking the appearance of as-
signment functions in semantic values like (18) too literally. After all, Heim
(2008, pp. 35–36) says that the assignment relative to which a sentence’s
content is determined “represents the speakers referential intentions”, not
that speakers have intentions about either assignment functions or numeri-
cal indices (emphasis added). Perhaps we should read the instance of gp1q
in (18) not as “the value of the assignment function g for 1”, but as a
kind of shorthand for a description of the speaker’s referential intentions
with respect to the relevant occurrence of “it”. We could say, for example,
that resolving the referent of an occurrence of “it” requires only that the
hearer recognize that the speaker intended this occurrence of “it” to refer
to a particular referent x (cf. King, 2013, 2014). Assignment functions are
formal stand-ins for facts about the speakers’ referential intentions, on this
view, and numerical indices are formal stand-ins for facts about speakers’
intentions about which expressions are anaphorically connected.
I am not optimistic about this view. The precise mathematical structures
of variable assignments are crucial to the semantic roles they play. It is
implausible that our central-cognitive conceptions of speakers’ referential
intentions are so well behaved as to be modeled by such precise mathematical
objects. At the very least, articulating this view adequately would require
saying considerably more than I have said here. But perhaps that could be
done.
Still, I think this view would raise a new and closely related problem,
because it would require language users to have beliefs and intentions about
20
every unbound variable in every sentence they use. But there are good rea-
sons to think that we lack central access to representations of at least some
variables. To take just one example, null-subject languages make it possible
to leave the subjects of many clauses unpronounced, but there is excellent
evidence that such unpronounced subjects enter into a wide range of syn-
tactic relations and can have both bound and deictic occurrences, much like
overt pronouns.24 Semanticists have also posited many other unpronounced,
semantically underspecified expressions. If understanding speech does re-
quire representing these null elements, then the representations in question
would seem to be centrally inaccessible. We have no ability to introspect
these representations, and, if they exist, then even speakers who believe
that they do not exist represent sentences as containing them nonetheless.
A plausible explanation of this fact is that null expressions are represented
only at intermediate stages of processing within the semantic module, and
do not feature in the module’s outputs. But in that case, the strategy of
reinterpreting (18) in terms of speakers’ referential intentions leads us to yet
another inadequate mixture of central and modular representations.
3.2 First steps
With my positive proposal I want to capture the virtues of the foregoing
account while positing sentential semantic values of a kind that both the se-
mantic module and central cognition can handle. Specifically, I will assume
that the outputs of semantics include representations of individuals, worlds,
properties, relations, and propositions, but not of assignment functions, in-
dices, or linguistic expressions themselves.
I will take sentential semantic values to be properties of propositions,
which I represent as type-xst, ty functions. For example, a rough first shot
at the semantic value of “it stinks” can be given as follows:25
(19) rrrit stinkssss = λpst . pDxqpp “ λw . x stinks at wq
In English: The semantic value of “it stinks” is a property possessed by
any proposition p such that, for some x, p is the proposition that x stinks.
This is a constraint on what can be said literally with “it stinks”. If I hear
24For a recent overview of the evidence for null subjects and their syntactic and semantic
properties, see Camacho (2013).
25This semantic value abstracts away from are clause-type, tense, aspect, and the φ-
features of “it”. I will show how to build the φ-features back in in Section 3.3.
Note that I leave the standard notation as it is, and write my preferred kind of semantic
values using triple brackets.
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someone utter “it stinks”, and if I assume that they are speaking literally
but do not know anything about the context or their referential intentions
on this occasion, all that my semantic module tells me about what they have
said is that it has this property. To work out what they have said, I need
further, extralinguistic information.26
How can semantic values like (19) be systematically derived? The fol-
lowing method is inelegant but simple. It is also similar to the method I
described in Section 3.1 for computing sentences’ characters, in that it piggy-
backs on the standard framework of content semantics and then removes the
undesirable features of that framework’s sentential semantic values at the
last moment, via an abstraction operation. What is needed is an abstraction
operation that takes us from (17) to (19).27
(17) Jit1 stinksKg = λw . gp1q stinks at w
(19) rrrit1 stinkssss = λpst . pDxqp “ λw . x stinks at w
This operation must remove the assignment dependency of its input while
appending what I call a prenex to its front.
(20) λpst . pDx1q . . . pDxnq p “looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
prenex
φ
I will use the term “prenex quantifiers” for the existential quantifiers con-
tained within a prenex. Generalizing from this example, what is needed is
an abstraction operation that respects the following constraint: For any ex-
pression α, and for each numerical index i to which at least one free variable
in α is indexed, there will be a quantifier in the prenex of rrrαsss that binds
all occurrences of a variable x, with one occurrence of x in rrrαsss substituted
for each occurrence of gpiq in JαKg. Here is a preliminary statement of this
operation:28
26Some readers may find it more intuitive to think of the semantic value of a sentence as
the set of propositions that can be literally expressed with it. The following is equivalent
to (19) for example.
(19)1 rrrit stinkssss = tp : pDxqpp “ λw . x stinks at wqu
When I hear someone utter “it stinks”, my semantic module tells me that what they said
is a proposition in this set (if they were speaking literally). I have to pragmatically infer
which of these propositions is the content of what they said.
27For now, I ignore the context parameter and indexicals. I will show how to handle
indexicals in Section 3.4.
28Notation: Subscripts on variables are numerical indices. Superscripts on variables are
merely for disambiguation.
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(21) Constraint Abstraction (preliminary version)
If α dominates unbound variables vi . . . vn and JαKg P Dτ
Then rrrαsss = λpτ . pDxiq . . . pDxnq . p = JαKgiÑxi...nÑxn
Constraint Abstraction is a general tool for converting assignment-relativized
intensions into constraints of the kind that I take to be the outputs of the
semantic module. Intensions of any semantic type can be converted in this
way. However, it is sufficient for my purposes to assume that the semantic
module applies this operation to the intensions of LFs’ root nodes as the last
step before sending the result as the module’s output to central cognition.
So far I have offered only a sketch of an account, and some bugs remain
to be fixed. Nonetheless, it can already be seen that the role of indices
and assignment functions has been substantially reduced and demystified as
compared to their role in standard content semantics. For one thing, the
semantic values I have posited are not relativized to assignment functions,
or contexts, or anything else. Indices and assignments still play a role at
intermediate levels of the compositional derivation. But since every variable
is eventually bound, either in the usual way or by a prenex quantifier, in-
dices and assignment functions play a mere bookkeeping role, coordinating
binding relations until the final semantic value is constructed. In fact, it
does not matter what is in the range of assignment functions, since they are
always eventually discharged. It would be fine, for example, if all unmodified
assignments were reflexive, simply mapping numerical indices to themselves.
The values they assign are mere placeholders.
3.3 The meanings of variables
The semantics I have sketched so far is on the right track but still needs work.
One problem is that my preliminary version of constraint abstraction is not
compositional in the strict sense abided by the standard framework. In order
to determine an output semantic value rrrαsss, this principle needs syntactic
information about the variables contained in α, and not merely semantic
information about its input semantic value, JαKg. A second problem is that
I have not shown how to distinguish the semantic contributions of different
semantically underspecified expressions. I will address these problems in
this section.
I begin with the relatively straightforward case study of “he” and “she”.
As I illustrated in Section 1, the standard way of capturing the semantic
difference between these two expressions is to say that they trigger pre-
suppositions that render their semantic values undefined relative to certain
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assignments. For any i and g, JheiKg is defined only if g maps i to a male,
for example. Nodes inherit the presuppositions of unbound pronouns they
dominate. And variable binders come with their own presuppositions that
enforce feature agreement with the presuppositions of the variables they
bind.29 However, by binding variables that are free at LF, the prenex quan-
tifiers that I have posited eliminate their assignment sensitivity, thereby
nullifying presuppositions triggered by their gender features. So I need a
different way of distinguishing the meanings of “he” and “she” in their un-
bound occurrences.
I can give a sense of what is needed by considering what the semantics
should say about sentences containing free occurrences of “he” and “she”. If
all I know about your utterance is that you used “he smokes” literally, what
can I know about what you have said? Roughly, that it is a proposition p
with the following property: For some male individual x, p is the proposition
that x smokes. Mutatis mutandis in the case of “she smokes”. This idea can
be captured by assigning the two sentences the following semantic values:
(22) rrrhe smokessss = λpst . pDxe : x is maleqpp “ λw . x smokes at w)
(23) rrrshe smokessss = λpst . pDxe : x is femaleqpp “ λw . x smokes at w)
What is needed is a way to distinguish the meanings of “he” and “she”
so that they contribute different restrictions to the prenex quantifiers that
bind them after constraint abstraction. The prenex quantifier that binds
a variable must be restricted by what I will call the variable’s constraint
property—the property that an entity has to have in order for a speaker to
use the variable literally to refer to it. A variable’s constraint property is
what one can know, solely by virtue of semantic competence, about what
someone who is speaking literally has used the variable to talk about.
I will write the constraint property of a variable v as µpvq. Here are the
constraint properties of “he” and “she”, for example:
(24) µ(he) = λxe . x is male
(25) µ(she) = λxe . x is female
Information about variables’ constraint properties is included in semantic
competence. I therefore adopt the following principle that expands on the
role of the lexicon as it applies to variables:
29This account comes in several versions, some of which also marshall syntactic resources
to explain some cases of agreement (Heim, 2008; Sauerland 2008).
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(26) Variables
If v is a variable, µpvq is specified in the lexicon.
This is not a radical departure from the standard framework, which builds
roughly the same information into each pronoun’s semantic value in the
form of a presupposition requirement on admissible assignment functions.
I propose that this information is also stored in the variable’s constraint
property, which encodes part of the evidence that speakers offer to hearers
when uttering an unbound occurrence of the variable, but that does not show
up in the content of what speakers say with it. When I say “he smokes”,
it is not part of the content of what I say that I am talking about a male;
rather, this information is a clue I give my addressee in order to help them
to recover my intended content.
What I need now is a compositional semantics that keeps track of the
constraint properties of all of the variables in an expression and a new-and-
improved Constraint Abstraction principle that installs them as restrictors
on the appropriate prenex quantifiers. I will accomplish this by assigning
every expression a double-barreled semantic value, as follows:30
(27) For every node α in every LF, JαKw,g “ xJαKw,g1 , JαK2y
The two coordinates within an expression’s semantic value track different
information about its meaning. The first coordinate, JαKg1, is α’s seman-
tic value according to the standard framework—an assignment-relativized
extension. The second coordinate, JαK2, keeps track of the constraint prop-
erties of any variables in α. Constraint Abstraction, as I will define it below,
puts these two values together into a single output semantic value, rrrαsss.
Because only variables have constraint properties, and J¨K2 stores infor-
mation about constraint properties, only variables are assigned substantive
values by J¨K2.
(28) For any variable v and numerical index i, JviK2 “ txi, µpvqyu
(29) For any non-variable lexical item α, JαK2 “ H.
On the other hand, we can stipulate that J¨Kw,g1 is identical to the interpre-
tation function of the standard framework.31
30My implementation is loosely inspired by Cooper’s (1975, 1983) method of storing and
retrieving the semantic values of object-position quantifiers, though the present account
is entirely different in its theoretical aims.
31For any expression α, JαKg = xJαKg1, JαK2y = xλw.JαKw,g1 , JαK2y.
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How do my double-barreled semantic values compose? What is needed
is an account of how the values of both J¨Kw,g1 and J¨K2 compose. Take the
latter first. The value of J¨K2 for each non-variable lexical item is the empty
set, and its value for each variable is a singleton set containing an index–
constraint pair. At any given complex node in an LF, we need J¨K2 to store
the constraint properties of whatever variables the node dominates. A first
stab at this could be accomplished by taking JαβK2 to be JαK2 Y JβK2. There
is just one complication: If α contains multiple coindexed variables, we wantJαK2 to contain just one corresponding index–constraint pair, with the coin-
dexed variables’ constraint properties conjoined. The following operation
collates and combines index–constraint pairs in this way.
(30) Definition of Z
For any numerical indices x1 . . . xn, y1 . . . ym and functionsX1 . . . Xn, Y 1 . . . Y m,
if χ “ txx1, X1y . . . xxn, Xnyu and γ “ txy1, Y 1y . . . xym, Y myu, then
χZ γ is defined as follows:
For every xxi, Xiy P χ and xyj , Y jy P γ:
• if xi “ y j and Dτ : Xi, Y j P Dτt then xxi, λyτ . Xipyq^Y jpyqy P
χZ γ
• if xi ­“ yj , then xxi, Xiy P χZ γ and xy j , Y jy P χZ γ
Nothing else is in χZ γ.
This operation takes two sets of index–constraint pairs, checks the indices
against one another, conjoins constraints that are paired with matching
indices, and otherwise unions the sets. This operation is how values of J¨K2
compose at branching nodes.
Values of J¨Kw,g1 compose by exactly the same principles posited by the
standard framework. This is the sense in which my account is conservative:
The standard framework continues to be a true theory of J¨Kw,g1 . I have
merely added to this theory.
Here is a version of functional application that will work for my purposes:
(31) Functional ApplicationJαβKw,g = xJαβKw,g1 , JαβK2y, such that:
• JαβKw,g1 “ JαKw,g1 pJβKw,g1 q or JβKw,g1 pJαKw,g1 q (whichever is defined);
and
• JαβK2 “ JαK2 Z JβK2
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Other composition principles can be derived from the standard ones in anal-
ogous ways.
Lastly, here is my updated version of Constraint Abstraction, which
works by combining the values of J¨Kw,g1 and J¨K2 at a node in order to create
an appropriate output semantic value of the kind that I outlined at the
beginning of this section:
(32) Constraint Abstraction (final version)
If JαKg2 = txi, f 1y . . . xj, f nyu and JαKg1 P Dτ
Then rrrαsss= λpτ . pDx1 : f 1px1qq . . . pDxn : f npxnqqpp= JαKgiÑx1...jÑxn1 q
It is straightforward to handle a range of variables within this framework.
For any variable v, the semantics need only include a lexical entry assigning
its constraint property. Some variables’ constraint properties may be nearly
vacuous, specifying nothing more than the variable’s semantic type. In other
cases, a variable’s constraint property may place complex constraints on how
it may be literally used.
3.4 Indexicals
What about other semantically underspecified expressions, such as the in-
dexicals, “I” and “you”, and the demonstratives, “this” and “that”? Fol-
lowing Kaplan (1989b), most philosophers take these expressions’ semantic
values to depend directly on the context parameter rather than the assign-
ment parameter. The theory that I have outlined so far posits no context
parameter, and in keeping with the spirit of constraint semantics as laid out
in Section 1, I would like to keep it that way.
My strategy will be to treat indexicals as yet more variables, much like
the pronouns that I have discussed so far. Although this strategy departs
from the standard practice among most philosophers, Heim and Kratzer
(1998, p. 244) treat first and second-person pronouns as variables that are
distinguished from third-person pronouns only by their φ-features.32
32One reason to treat indexicals as variables is that they have bound occurrences, as in
the relevant readings of the following examples:
(i) [Each of you]1 believes that you1 are right.
(ii) Whenever a pianist comes to visit, we have to play duets (Nunberg, 1993; Partee,
1989).
(iii) Only I got a question that I understood (Partee, 1989).
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On my view, indexicals and demonstratives differ semantically from
other variables with respect to their constraint properties. The constraint
properties of indexicals are special because they involve a kind of token-
reflexivity, in the sense that they make reference to properties of “the ut-
terance being interpreted”. I can spell out the constraint properties of a
variety of indexicals as follows, for example:
(33) µ(I) = λxe . x is the speaker of the utterance being interpreted
(34) µ(you) = λxe . x is the addressee of the utterance being interpreted
33
(35) µ(today) = λxe . x is the day on which the utterance being interpreted
was produced
(36) µ(now) = λxe . x is an interval of time during which the utterance
being interpreted was produced
(37) µ(here) = λxe . x is a location in space within which the utterance
being interpreted was produced34
It might be objected that by including the description, “the utterance being
interpreted”, in these constraint properties, I am sneaking reference to the
context of utterance, in something like Kaplan’s sense, back into my seman-
tics. But the token-reflexive descriptions featured in indexicals’ constraint
properties function rather differently than the context-sensitive semantic
values of Kaplan. In Kaplanian semantics, an indexical’s semantic value
is identical to its referent, and the context is a collection of entities that
serve as the referents of indexicals. The semantic value of “I”, relative to a
context c, is speakerc, which is just the speaker themself. But as I argued
in Section 2, the semantic module lacks access to information about who
the speaker is. Identifying the speaker of an utterance is a central-cognitive
task that may require who-knows-what extralinguistic information. Since
the semantic module cannot identify the speaker on its own, it cannot plug
in the speaker as the semantic value of an expression.
Instead, the occurrences of “the utterance being interpreted” in (33)–
(37) should be understood as attributive definite descriptions in the meta-
language in which the semantic module’s outputs are framed. In language
33This entry deals only with singular “you”, and would need to be generalized in some
way to handle plural senses of “you”.
34There are uses of “here” not captured by this constraint property, such as when one
points to a map and says “I’ll meet you here”. It is unclear whether it is desirable to try
to unify these senses.
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perception, semantic module presumes that there is a unique utterance that
it is interpreting, and it uses “the utterance being interpreted” to attribu-
tively pick out this utterance. It hands this description upstairs to the
central system(s), one of whose jobs is to identify the description’s denota-
tion.
In some cases, the semantic module’s presumption of a unique utterance
that it is interpreting may turn out to be mistaken. Consider, for example,
the well worn example of stones on a beach, arranged by a storm into the
shape of a sentence. In this case, there is no utterance to interpret, and the
agent may realize this, but the stones are sufficiently similar to the evidence
usually left behind by genuine utterances that the faculty of language fires
up and construes the “sentence” as having a meaning just the same. One
property that the semantic module might thus misattribute is the property
of standing in thus-and-such a relation to “the utterance being interpreted”
when there is, in fact, no such utterance, but only a stimulus that super-
ficially resembles the product of an utterance. I take this phenomenon to
be a genuine perceptual illusion wherein an agent’s input systems persist
in attributing properties to a stimulus that, the agent knows full well, the
stimulus does not have.
What about the demonstratives, “this” and “that”? If “this” and “that”,
in their bare uses, are unstructured referring expressions, then their con-
straint properties can be given roughly as follows:35
(38) µ(this) = λxe . e is “proximal” from the perspective of the speaker of
the utterance being interpreted
(39) µ(that) = λxe . e is “distal” from the perspective of the speaker of
the utterance being interpreted
I place “proximal” and “distal” in scare quotes to signal that they are unex-
plicated technical terms—mere placeholders until someone comes up with a
substantive account of the difference in these words’ meanings. “Distal” and
“proximal” cannot be understood in purely spatial ways because we can use
“this” and “that” to talk about abstracta. Nonetheless, there is some dif-
ference in the constraint properties of “this” and “that”, and this difference
seems to have something to do with proximity and distance in their ordinary
senses. It is normally felicitous to say “this is a nice apartment”, but not
“that is a nice apartment”, about an apartment in which one is sitting, for
example.
35For arguments that demonstratives are variables, see Nowak (fc).
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4 CONCLUSIONS
There is much more to say about how the project of this essay could be
expanded and refined, but I have run out of space. For now I hope to have
made a plausible case for the following conclusions. Compositional semantics
is the project of reverse-engineering the proprietary database of a centrally
inaccessible and informationally encapsulated input–output system. This
system’s job is to encode and decode partial and defeasible evidence of what
speakers use sentences to say. Hearers must rely on central-cognitive re-
sources to integrate this evidence with whatever else is available in order
to identify what the speaker has said, as well as what they have otherwise
meant. We can adopt this view without sacrificing a rigorous formal seman-
tics. If we do, the semantics–pragmatics interface turns out to be precise
and grounded in underlying features of human cognitive architecture.
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